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The Eleventh Circuit Gives the Banking
Industry a Lesson About Reverse
Preemption in Barnett Bank of Marion
County, NA. v. Gallagher
Recently, in Barnett Bank of Marion County, N.A. v. Gallagher,' the
United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit was presented
with the question of whether Florida's prohibition against affiliations
between banks and insurance agents was protected from preemption by
the McCarran-Ferguson Act.2 The appellant, Barnett Marion, is a
subsidiary of Barnett Banks, Inc., the largest bank holding company
centered in Florida? Barnett Marion maintains its principal place of
business in Ocala, Florida; however, it owns and operates a branch in
Belleview, Florida, a locality where the population is less than five
thousand.4 On October 18, 1993, Barnett Marion purchased Linda
Clifford Insurance, Inc. from Linda K. Clifford in Belleview.5 That same
day, Barnett Marion sought a declaration asking that they be allowed to
market insurance to customers throughout the State of Florida from the
branch office." Barnett requested the declaration due to two conflicting
statutes. Florida maintains a statute which precludes bank subsidiaries
from engaging in insurance activities.' However, 12 U.S.C. § 92 permits

1. 43 F.3d 631 (11th Cir. 1995), cert. granted, 116 S. Ct. 39 (U.S. Sept. 27, 1995) (No.
94-1837).
2. McCarran-Ferguson Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1011-1015 (1988).
3. Barnett Banks of Marion County, N.A. v. Gallagher, 839 F. Supp. 835,837 (M.D. Fla.
1993).
4. 43 F.3d at 632.
5. 839 F. Supp. at 837. The decision to purchase the company was founded on a
recommendation by the Executive Committee of Barnett Banks, Inc. Barnett purchased

the insurance *company's assets including the company's name. Furthermore, Clifford's
employees became employees of Barnett Banks. Id.
6.

43 F.3d at 633. Specifically the bank requested the following: "Barnett Bank and,

specifically Barnett Bank Belleview, is authorized and empowered by federal law to act as
an agent for any insurance company authorized by the state of Florida to do business in
Florida." Id. (quoting R1-1-7).
7. FLA. STAT. ch. 626.988 (1995). The statute provides in part: "No insurance agent
or solicitor ... who is associated with, under contract with, retained by, owned or
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national banks to act as insurance agents in towns having a population
of fewer than five thousand people.' Barnett contended that the federal
statute preempted the state statute, and therefore they should be
allowed to act as an insurance agent for any authorized insurance
company in Florida.9 On October 22, 1993, the Florida Department of
Insurance issued an Immediate Final Order mandatingthat Clifford and
her agents discontinue all insurance activities other than selling credit
disability and credit life insuran 'ce.10 In response, Barnett Marion filed
motions seeking either a temporary restraining order or a preliminary
injunction." The United States District Court for the Middle District
of Florida denied both motions and the case went to trial. 2 The
district court looked to the McCarran-Ferguson Act," which was
enacted in 1945 to ensure that states, and not the federal government,
regulate the insurance industry. 4 The statute creates a reverse
preemption doctrine in the insurance arena whereby a state law which
regulates the business of insurance is presumed to invalidate a federal
law "unless the federal law specifically relates to the business of
insurance." 5 The district court held that the Florida anti-affiliate
statute is a law regulating the business of insurance and that section 92
is not a law which specifically relates to the business of insurance, and
therefore the state statute does not yield to the federal statute." The
United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit affirmed the
district court's decision and declared that the district court had correctly
interpreted and applied the conflicting statutes. 7
In 1869, in Paul v. Virginia," the United States Supreme Court held
that issuing an insurance policy was not a transaction which fell under
Congress's Commerce Clause powers pursuant to Article I, section 8 of
the United States Constitution. 9 For approximately seventy-five years
following this decision, Congress believed that insurance regulation was

controlled by, to any degree, directly or indirectly, or employed by, a financial institution,
shall engage in insurance agency activities as an employee, officer, director, agent, or

associate of a financial institution agency." Id.

8. 12 U.S.C. § 92 (1916).
9. 43 F.3d at 633.
10.
11.
12.
13.
14.
15.
16.

Id.
Id.
Id.
15 U.S.C. §§ 1011-1015.
839 F. Supp. at 839-40.
15 U.S.C. § 1012(b).
839 F. Supp. at 843.

17. 43 F.3d at 637.
18. 75 U.S. (8 Wall.) 168 (1868).
19. Id. at 183.
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beyond the scope of its power.2' However, the Supreme Court started
enlarging the powers of Congress under the Commerce Clause in
response to the emergence of an interconnected national economy, and
in 1944 the Supreme Court, in United States v. South-Eastern UnderwritersAss'n,21 held that regulation of interstate insurance activity was
not beyond Congress's Commerce Clause power.22 Congress responded
adversely to the decision in South-Eastern Underwriters and within a
year passed the McCarran-Ferguson Act to return the supremacy of
insurance regulation'to the states. 2
The Act's policy statement
provided that "Congress hereby declares that the continued regulation
and taxation by the several States of the business of insurance is in the
public interest."24 Section 1012 of the Act proclaimed that "[no act of
Congress shall be construed to invalidate, impair, or supersede any law
enacted by any State for the purpose of regulating the business of
insurance, or which imposes a fee or a tax upon such business, unless
such Act specifically relates to the business of insurance."25 The result
was the foundation of a reverse-preemption doctrine for regulating the
insurance industry.26 A state statute regulating the business of
insurance would now be deemed to presumptively preempt a conflicting
federal law unless the federal statute specifically related to insurance.27
A few years later in Prudential Insurance Co. v. Benjamin,28 the
Supreme Court examined the McCarran-Ferguson Act for the first time.
The Court stated that "[olbviously Congress' purpose was broadly to give
support to the existing and future state systems for regulating and
taxing the business of insurance."29 Over the next twenty-three years,
the states were given almost full authority to regulate and tax the
insurance industry. However, in 1969 the Court began to permit greater
federal regulation over the insurance industry. Most of the important

20. John F. Wagner, Jr., Annotation, Supreme Court's Views as to Validity, Construction, and Application of McCarran-FergusonAct, Concerning Regulation of Business of

Insurance by State or FederalLaw, 125 L. Ed. 2d 879 (1995).
21.

322 U.S. 533 (1944).

22. Id. at 553. The decision in this case clearly invited Congress to pass legislation
specifically aimed at regulating the insurance industry. Id.
23. 43 F.3d at 634. In fact, at the time the court handed down its decision in SouthEastern Underwriters,Congress was already considering a bill exempting the insurance
industry from antitrust laws. SEC v. National Secs., Inc., 393 U.S. 453, 458 (1969)
(referring to 90 Cong. Rec. 6565 (1944)).
24. 15 U.S.C. § 1011.
25, Id. § 1012(b).
26. 43 F.3d at 634.
27. Id.
28. 328 U.S. 408 (1946).
29. Id. at 429.
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cases focused on the language in section 1012(b) of the Act-the debates
centered on determining what constitutes the "business of insurance."
In SEC v. National Securities, Inc.,3 the Court dealt with the issue of
whether the SEC was prohibited by the McCarran-Ferguson Act from
bringing an action under the Securities Exchange Act against a
shareholder of an insurance company. 1 The Court held that the
McCarran-Ferguson Act did not prevent the SEC from bringing the
action because the state statute that was involved actually dealt with
securities regulation and not insurance regulation.' In reaching this
decision, the Court observed that statutes which were directed at
protecting the relationship between the insurance company and the
policyholder were laws regulating the business of insurance." Later,
in Group Life & Health Insurance Co. v. Royal Drug Co.," the Court
attempted to clarify the meaning of the phrase business of insurance.
The Supreme Court stated that one of the main factors to consider is the
risk to the policyholders.35 In United Labor Life Insurance Co. v.
Pireno,36 the Supreme Court actually established specific elements to
consider when construing the phrase "business of insurance." 7 The
case dealt with whether the use of a peer review committee by a
chiropractic association to advise insurers as to whether charges for
chiropractic services were necessary and reasonable constituted the
business of insurance.3" In reaching its decision that this practice was
not part of the business of insurance, the Court set out three basic
criteria: "[F]irst, whether the practice has the effect of transferring or
spreading a policyholder's risk; second, whether the practice is an
integral part of the policy relationship between the insurer and the
insured; and third, whether the practice is limited to entities within the
insurance industry." 9 More recently, the Supreme Court in United
States Department of Treasury v. Fabe, ° explained the relationship of
these criteria to the McCarran-Ferguson Act. In Fabe, the Court was
asked to determine whether the federal priority statute, 31 U.S.C.

30.
31.
32.
33.

393 U.S. 453 (1969).
Id. at 455-57.
Id. at 460.
Id.

34. 440 U.S. 205 (1979).

35. Id. at 211-12. The Court stressed that the "spreading and underwriting of a
policyholder's risk" are the foundations of an insurance contract. Id. at 211.
36.

458 U.S. 119 (1982).

37.
38.
39.
40.

Id. at 129.
Id. at 122-23.
Id. at 129.
113 S. Ct. 2202 (1993).
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§ 3713, which establishes priority concerning bankrupt debtors'
obligations, preempted an inconsistent Ohio priority statute that dealt
In analyzing the issue, the
with insolvent insurance companies.4 1
Court noted an important distinction between the first and second
clauses of section 1012(b) of the McCarran-Ferguson Act.42 According
to the Court, the first clause "is not so narrowly circumscribed" as the
second clause.' As a result, a less stringent standard must be applied
when determining whether the state statute regulates the business of
insurance. The Court went on to hold that the Ohio statute was
protected from preemption due to the fact that it regulated the
relationship between policyholders and the insurance company." In a
1995 Supreme Court case, the banking industry won an important battle
in its war against the insurance industry. In NationsBank of North
Carolina, N.A. v. Variable Annuity Life Insurance Co.,4 the question
presented was whether national banks may act as agents for the sale of
variable and fixed rate annuities." The Supreme Court ruled that
annuities are not insurance products; instead, they are investment
products, and therefore banks are entitled to market and sell them
under the incidental powers clause of the National Banking Act.47 The
holding was a major setback for the insurance industry. Recently, the
Sixth Circuit also rendered a decision which pleased proponents of the
banking industry. In Owensboro National Bank v. Stephens,41 decided
just one month prior to the decision in Barnett, the Sixth Circuit
addressed whether a Kentucky statute which prohibited banks from
selling insurance other than credit-related insurance was preempted by
section 92. 4" In a split decision, the court held that section 92, which
permits banks to act as insurance agents in towns of fewer than five
thousand people, preempted the Kentucky statute.'0 The court in
Owensboro reached its conclusion by determining that the Kentucky

41. Id. at 2204. The Ohio statute involved priority upon claims in actions to liquidate

insolvent insurance companies, Id.
42. Id. at 2210.
43, Id. at 2209.
44. Id. at 2212. The Court emphasized the rule that state laws that were created for
the purpose of regulating insurance "do not yield to conflicting federal statutes unless a
federal statute specifically requires otherwise." Id. at 2211.
45. 115 S. Ct. 810 (1995).
46. Id. at 811.
47. Id at 817.

48. 44 F.3d 388 (6th Cir. 1994).
49. Id. at 389.
50. Id. at 392.
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statute did not meet the criteria set forth in Pireno.51 The majority
argued that a statute which excludes a person or entity from engaging
in an activity is a regulation of the person.52 In comparison, a statute
which regulates the manner in which an activity is conducted is a
statute regulating the activity.5" The court found that the Kentucky
statute fell into the former category, and therefore it did not regulate the
business of insurance." As a result, the McCarran-Ferguson Act did
not rescue the Kentucky statute from preemption.5" This decision is in
direct conflict with the Eleventh Circuit's decision in Barnett."s
The McCarran-Ferguson Act provides that "[n]o Act of Congress shall
be construed to invalidate, impair, or supersede any law enacted by any
State for the purpose of regulating the business of insurance, or which
imposes a fee or tax upon such business, unless such Act specifically
relates to the business of insurance." 7 In Barnett, the court proceeded
through a two step analysis in reaching its conclusion that the McCarran-Ferguson Act required that section 92 yield to the Florida statute."
First, the court had to determine whether the Florida statute regulates
insurance. Second, a determination of whether section 92 specifically
relates to insurance was required. 9 The Eleventh Circuit applied the
criteria espoused in Fabes° in an attempt to establish whether the
Florida statute regulated the business of insurance."' The Florida
statute prohibited insurance agents associated with financial institutions
from selling insurance products.6 2 The court focused on the relationship between the insurance company and the policyholder." Particular

51.

Id.

52. Id.
53. Id.
54. Id.
55. Id. In a well-reasoned dissent, Judge Batchelder argued that the majority had
misapplied Pireno. The dissent determined that the Pireno factors were only relevant to
the first clause of the McCarran-Ferguson Act. Furthermore, the dissent applied the more
recent decision in Fabe which distinguished the first and second clauses of the McCarranFerguson Act. Under this analysis, the dissent found that the Kentucky statute's aim was
to protect policy holders and was therefore a statute which regulated the business of
insurance. Moreover, the dissent determined that section 92 did not specifically relate to
the business of insurance, and therefore the Kentucky statute was saved from preemption
by the McCarran-Ferguson Act. Id. at 394-98 (Batchelder, J., dissenting).
56. 43 F.3d at 637.
57. 15 U.S.C. § 1012(b).
58. 43 F.3d at 634.
59. Id.
60. 113 S. Ct. at 2210.
61. 43 F.3d at 634.
62. Id. at 634-35.
63. Id. at 635.
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emphasis was placed on state court interpretations of the statute and on
testimony from the Director of Legal Services for the Florida Department
of Insurance in determining that the purpose of the statute involved was
to regulate "the insurance-purchasing public at large."' Furthermore,
the court looked at the abuses that the statute was trying to prevent-coercion, undue concentration of economic resources, and unfair
trade practices.65 Barnett, however, argued that the statute was
enacted merely in an attempt to isolate the "independent insurance
agents from competition by financial institutions.'" The court strongly
disagreed with this position, maintaining instead that the statute
protects policyholders by ensuring that banks remain at arms length and
remain objective when conducting transactions with the insurer and the
insured. 7 Therefore, the court held that the Florida statute did in fact
regulate the business of insurance." Applying Fabe, the court opined
that state laws which regulate the business of insurance "do not yield to
conflicting federal laws unless the federal statute specifically requires
otherwise.'
At this point, the inquiry centered on whether section 92
specifically required otherwise.7" In looking at the legislative history,
the Eleventh Circuit noted that Congress enacted section 92 in 1916.71
At that time, and for approximately thirty years thereafter, Congress
believed that it did not possess the power to regulate the insurance
industry. It was not until 1944, in South-Eastern Underwriters, that
Congress realized that it had the authority to regulate insurance under
the Commerce Clause. 7' Therefore, when Congress enacted section 92,
it could not have intended to regulate the insurance industry because it
believed that it lacked the power to do so." The court concluded that
the statute was aimed at the banking industry and not the insurance
industry.7 4 As a result, the court held that section 92 does not specifi-

64. Id. (citing testimony of the Director of Legal Services for the Florida Department
of Insurance (R3-69-16)).
65. Id. (construing Glendale Fed. Sav.& Loan Ass'n v. Florida Dep't of Ins., 587 So. 2d
534 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1991)).
66. Id. at 636 (quoting Appellant's Brief at 35).
67. Id.

68. Id.
69. Id. (quoting Fabe, 113 S. Ct. at 2211).
70. Id.
71.

Id.

72. Id.at 637.
73. Id.
74.

Id.
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cally relate to the business of insurance and therefore it is preempted by
the Florida statute by way of the McCarran-Ferguson Act.75
The decision in Barnett represents a major victory for the insurance
industry and appears to lay the foundation enabling a state to prohibit
banks from selling insurance even in towns with fewer than five
thousand residents. The decision suggests that states still possess
extensive authority over the regulation of the insurance industry and
may completely prohibit banks from engaging in general insurance
activities in their states. However, just one month before the Eleventh
Circuit decided Barnett, the Sixth Circuit in Owensboro National Bank
v. Stephens,7 rendered a decision in direct conflict with Barnett. This
conflict between the circuits led to the Supreme Court granting certiorari
on September 27, 1995. 77 The Supreme Court's decision will have far

reaching ramifications on two of the nations largest and most powerful
industries. The banking industry maintains that statutes such as
Florida's do not fall within the confines of the McCarran-Ferguson
'Act.78
Their argument is that the McCarran-Ferguson Act was
designed to regulate how the insurance industry is conducted.7 9 They
contend that statutes such as Florida's, however, completely bar
entrance into the business of insurance and are not regulating but are
merely prohibiting competition.'
The insurance industry, however,
believes that statutes such as Florida's are necessary for the protection
of policyholders.8 1 The fear is that there will be a loss of arms-length
transactions resulting in increased pressure placed on the policyholders,
which could lead to improper insurance decisions.8 2 If the Supreme
Court sides with the insurance companies, the result will be that states
will maintain significant flexibility in regulating the insurance industry
in their states thereby protecting insurance companies from intrusion
into this lucrative arena. However, if the Supreme Court decision favors
Barnett, the banking industry will have a firm backing for encroaching
even further into the insurance industry. In either situation, the time

75. Id.
76. 44 F.3d at 388.
77. 116 S. Ct. at 39.
78. Jaret Seiberg, High Court to Rule on Bank Sales of Insurance, AMERICAN BANKER,
Sept. 28, 1995, at 2 (referring to comments made by Julia Williams, chief counsel at the
Office of the Comptroller of the Currency).
79. Id.

80. Id.
81. 43 F.3d at 635 (referring to testimony of Mr. Shropshire, Director of Legal Services
for the Florida Department of Insurance).
82. Id.
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might be ripe for Congress to step in and clarify exactly what authority
it wishes for states to have over the insurance industry.
JESS PINKERTON

